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Abstract
Official flows account for close to half of capital flows to developing countries, and close
to 90 per cent of receipts for Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper documents trends in these
official flows over the last three decades. The most striking trend has been declining aid
volume. Following two decades of relative stability, official flows have decline in the
1990s; in particular aid to just 0.2 per cent of donor GNP. A second trend is the decline in
aid to low-income countries, partly as aid flows are diverted to transition economies and
‘trouble spots’. As a result of these trends, real aid per capita to Sub-Saharan Africa fell
by 40 per cent in the 1990s. Continuing an existing trend, multilateral agencies have
accounted for a growing share of total aid, in part as a result of the expansion of EU aid,
but non-EU donors have contributed more of their aid through the UN system. Positive
developments have been the increased concessionality of aid and a move toward untying.
However, substantial parts of the multilateral system, notably the World Bank, continue to
extend loans rather than grants. And the move to untying is not well-established, having
been somewhat reversed in some countries in recent years.  Finally, the aid programme of
most donors is thinly spread over many recipients. Whilst there are good grounds to
question the current fashion for selectivity, there remain good developmental arguments
for greater concentration by individual donors.
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11 Introduction
Aid continues to be of great relevance to international development, particularly in the
poorest countries. However, after four decades of growth, real aid declined in the 1990s.
This decline was to some extent offset by improvements in quality measures. This study
documents these changes, such as reduced tying and greater concessionality.
Section 2 provides a brief historical overview, including main features of the aid scene.
The bulk of the study is concerned with the quantity and quality of aid, as captured in
various measures of donor performance. The evolution of aid volume and its relation to
other international flows are discussed in section 3. Section 4 examines changes in the
allocation of aid and other official flows, aid tying and the financial terms of aid.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical overview
The origins of aid can be traced back to the development efforts undertaken by colonial
authorities (see Hjertholm and White 2000), but the modern multilateral institutions
dealing with aid emerged in the 1940s with most bilateral donors coming on the scene
in the 1960s. White (1974) provides a periodization of aid until the early 1970s, and
Hjertholm and White (2000: 81) an alternative schema. Two of the main points to
emerge from these analyses are institutional changes and various shifts in the pattern of
aid.
The dominance of different institutions has changed over time. Until the mid-1950s the
US was the only donor of note, including as the main funder of the UN system. The
launch of Soviet aid in 1956 ushered in a period of explicit competition between the US
and USSR with aid as an instrument of foreign policy interests. Countries with colonies,
notably the UK and France, became donors as they shed their last substantial colonies in
the early to mid-1960s, with others, such as the Scandinavian countries, establishing
formal aid programmes by the late 1960s. Multilateral aid, in the shape of the UN, has
been present since the 1950s, but gained importance with the growth of the World Bank
and IMF from the early 1970s.
There have been changing fashions in both aid instruments and the underlying ideology
of aid donors. In the early years bilateral agencies engaged in technical assistance, with
some budget support to newly independent countries, in the belief that projects were
best undertaken by the multilateral agencies with the requisite skills. But by the 1970s
projects had become the mainstay of the aid business. More recent trends toward budget
support and sector programmes notwithstanding, projects continue to dominate the aid
scene. A further development in the 1970s was an increased emphasis on aid for social
sectors, which has once again become a popular theme. But the ideology changed from
one of state-directed development to a vision of market-based growth (see Thorbecke
[2000] for a more detailed discussion of ideological and theoretical shifts). There have
been indications of a move back toward a more balanced view of the complementary
roles of state and market, but they are taking quite some time to feed through to the
practice of aid.
23 Trends in the quantity of aid
Aid is just one of several sources of capital flows into developing countries. The main
source of aid data is the Development Assistance Committee which distinguishes
official flows, private (commercial) flows and grants from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Aid flows are the largest part of official flows. DAC recognizes as ‘aid’ flows to
developing countries and multilateral institutions from official agencies which satisfy
two criteria: (i) be primarily intended for development purposes (which rules out both
military aid and export credits), and (ii) be highly concessional, defined as having a
grant element of at least 25 per cent.1 DAC maintains a two-part list of ‘eligible
recipients’. Flows meeting the above criteria to countries on Part I are called official
development assistance (ODA), and those to countries on Part II called official aid
(OA).2 A further category, official development finance (ODF), comprises bilateral
ODA, multilateral receipts (both concessional and non-concessional) and non-trade
related official flows (in particular loans to refinance debt). Other official flows (OOF)
are official transactions for which the main objective is not development, or if it is, the
funds are insufficiently concessional to qualify as ODA/OA. The main items of OOF
are export credits, official sector equity and portfolio investment and debt
re-organization at non-concessional terms.
Table 1 shows the changing pattern of these different flows. For developing countries as
a whole, the importance of ODA is down from the 1980s, but higher than in the 1970s.
The difference between the 1980s and 1990s is largely accounted for by variations in
private flows, which shrank considerably during the years for the debt crisis, but grew
again from the early 1990s. There is a view in some quarters that aid is becoming
redundant, and its place will be taken by increased trade and private capital.3 The data
in Table 1 show no sign of this happening. In the 1990s, aid was still 40 per cent of
flows to all developing countries, and close to 90 per cent of those received by Sub-
Saharan Africa. In fact the resurgence of private capital flows has been highly
concentrated in a few countries. Lensink and White (1998) present a formal model of
access to international capital markets, showing that a large number of countries simply
cannot obtain these funds. Hence the institution of aid should be expected to continue
for some time.
                                                
1 The grant element is the grant equivalent divided by the face value, where the grant equivalent is the
face value of the loan less the present value of repayments discounted at 10 per cent. A grant has a
grant element of 100 per cent and a loan with an interest rate of 10 per cent a grant element of 0 per
cent.
2 Part I countries are mostly low and middle-income countries (in 2000 two high-income countries,
Malta and Slovenia were on Part I). Part II countries are high income countries, including those in
Eastern and Central Europe. A review of the list takes place very three years. Those countries which
have been above the upper middle income country threshold should be graduated, though DAC
reserve the right not to graduate by taken into account other criteria (or to graduate countries not
satisfying the income criterion on the same basis).
3 For discussions of these views, see Hewitt (1994), White (1999), and  Edwards (2000).
3Table 1
Total net disbursements of total official and private flows by type, 1971-2000 (%)
1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000
All developing countries
Official development assistance (ODA) 36.7 50.8 40.4
Other official flows (OOF) 8.7 6.6 5.1
Private flows 50.7 38.2 50.7
Grants from NGOs 3.9 4.4 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sub-Saharan African countries
Official development assistance (ODA) 59.5 77.8 88.5
Other official flows (OOF) 11.2 14.4 0.8
Private flows 29.3 7.9 10.7
Grants from NGOs na na na
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD/DAC on-line database.
Table 1 also shows that grants from NGOs have been remarkably stable at about 4 per
cent of total flows. Hence, if they were to be included with ODA, they would be about
8 per cent of the resulting total. This figure represents the funds which NGOs raise
themselves. They also act as a channel for ODA. DAC data have a line ‘support to
NGOs’, which has been stable at 1.5 per cent of total ODA for the last two decades (see
Table 15), so that aid through NGOs is about 10 per cent of the total of ODA plus grants
from NGOs. However, this line covers direct flows from agencies to NGOs to spend on
their own programmes, and does not capture cases when the NGO is the implementing
agency for a project funded by that agency. Whilst data are not available on the latter, it
is generally believed to have increased quite substantially since the mid-1980s.
DAC donors dominate the aid scene, more so today than in the past since aid from what
were the two main groups of non-DAC donors (Soviet bloc and OPEC) has been
declining over time, becoming relatively insignificant by the 1990s. In 2000 non-DAC
donors provided US$1,120 million of ODA (net), of which US$780 million was
bilateral. The main donors from the non-DAC group are three Arab countries (Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and UAE), accounting for over half the total, with Korea and Israel
accounting for the bulk of the remainder. By contrast, Saudi Arabia alone gave US$3.7
million in net ODA in 1990, and Arab donors were substantially more generous than
OECD ones, with Saudi Arabia giving 3.9 per cent of its GNP in aid and UAE 2.6 per
cent. However, although of some interest to those following developments in aid, the
current figure for non-DAC aid corresponds to just over 2 per cent of total overall and
total bilateral aid. Hence non-DAC donors can be ignored in discussing overall trends in
aid.
Figure 1 shows trends in aid volume since the late 1960s. Four series are shown: net
ODA in current prices, net ODA deflated by both the unit import price index for
developing countries and the GDP data of donor countries, and as a per cent of donor
4GNP.4 In nominal terms, aid increased in nearly every year until the early 1990s, when
it peaked at US$62.7 billion in 1992. In the next four years the total then fell by US$15
billion, dropping to US$47.9 billion in 1997, recovering slightly and erratically in the
following years. These trends are more muted, but still present, when real aid is
considered. The choice of deflator depends whether we are interested in the value of aid
given from the point of view of developed or developing countries. Using an import
price index, the rise in aid in the 1980s was quite marked, though since then real aid has
fluctuated quite substantially, but with no evident trend, in the 1990s. Using the donor
GDP deflator shows the same steady increase as seen for nominal aid until the early
1990s, with a real decline of nearly 15 per cent in the middle of that decade. The trend
in aid’s share of donor income also shows the deterioration in the 1990s. The average
for the whole period is well under one-half of one per cent: aid is a tiny share of donor
income. Having fallen from the 1960s, this average fluctuated between 0.30 and 0.35
for two decades, but then fell to its present level of just 0.20. There is a UN target,
adopted by all DAC members other than the US and Switzerland, that aid should be 0.7
per cent of GNP.5 But that target is further away than ever from being met.
Why has aid fallen in the 1990s? One reason may be thought to be diversion to other
uses. In particular, rather than realizing a peace divided from the end of the cold war,
funds have been taken up the needs of the former-communist countries. To the extent
that these countries do not qualify as ODA-recipients then ODA will fall. Whilst this is
part of the story, the data do not bear out the view that it is the whole picture. In 2000
Figure 1
Trends in net ODA to developing countries, 1967-2000
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4 DAC now uses gross national income (GNI) as the denominator. This chapter uses the more familiar
GNP, although this is not strictly the same as GNP.
5 See White and Woestman (1994) for discussion of the target.
5official aid (OA) was US$7.8 billion. Since total ODA in that year was US$49.5 billion,
then OA ‘accounted for’ about 60 per cent of the ‘shortfall’ in ODA compared to its
nominal peak in 1992.6 But, between 1993 and 2000, OA rose by US$2 billion,
compared to the fall in ODA of US$6 billion (Appendix Table A.1), suggesting that
increased OA explains an even smaller part of the fall in ODA. Hence, additional
reasons for the fall in ODA have to be sought.7 Likely reasons are also related to
negative repercussions from the end of the cold war. At least two cases of decline in aid
have a clear association with the decline of the Soviet bloc: that of Finland, whose
economy, and particularly its external trade sector (and hence availability of forex to
give away), suffered from the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that of the United States
whose aid has always been the most politically motivated and so consequently lost
interest once the cold war was won. In addition, the US has traditionally given 20-25
per cent of its aid to Israel. The graduation of Israel off Part I of the DAC list thus badly
hit the volume of US ODA (since the money has continued to flow to Israel, rather than
be re-allocated to countries eligible for ODA).
But the fall in aid has been a general phenomenon, not one restricted to one or two
donors. Comparing with the late 1980s or early 1990s most donors have recorded falling
aid as a per cent of GNP, in some cases a very substantial one. Eleven donors recorded a
substantial decline in aid performance (a fall of more than 0.1 per cent of GNP), and
five others a small fall (Table 2). Of those five, it should be mentioned that Spain has
managed a substantial growth in the programme compared to its modest beginnings in
the late 1980s at less than 0.1 per cent of GNP. The largest falls have been recorded
amongst both good performers such as Norway and Sweden, but also amongst poor
performers, most notably the US (from 0.21 in 1991 to 0.08 in 1997, recovered to 0.10
by 2000). Only one country, the UK has experienced no change, in fact being a story of
a decline from the mid 1990s, reversed in just the last two years. Four countries have
implemented increasing aid ratios: a very substantial one in the case of Luxembourg,
and in the case of Denmark bringing it up to the position of ‘top ranking donor’.
Underlying these country-level trends have been substantial shifts in the relative
importance of different donors. Table 3 shows these changes. The most striking figure is
the falling share of the US, from over half in the 1960s to well under a fifth by the end
of the 1990s. The largest rise is that of Japan, which became the largest single donor in
the early 1990s. However, the US remains the second largest donor in absolute terms,
with a programme just over double that of the next rank of donors (France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom). Whilst the shares of the former colonial donors, France,
Germany and the UK, have not changed greatly since the 1960s, the share of the new
European donors has risen. That of the Scandinavians grew mostly quickly from the
1960s to the early 1970s. The programmes of southern European donors grew in the
1980s, continuing its growth in the next decade, dropping back slightly with the drastic
cut in Italian aid in the late1990s.
                                                
6 This accounting is a slight over-estimate as Part II countries include some former Part I recipients who
were graduated, but most OA goes to FSU and Eastern Europe.
7 On the other hand, as shown below, there has been a reallocation within ODA toward European
recipients, mainly at the expense of Sub-Saharan Africa.
6Table 2
Changes in aid volume, circa 1990 to 2000
Fall in excess of 0.1 % of GNI Fall below 0.1% of GNI
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Finland 0.80 0.31 -0.49 Germany 0.42 0.37 -0.05
Norway 1.17 0.80 -0.37 Japan 0.32 0.28 -0.04
France 0.61 0.32 -0.29 New Zealand 0.27 0.25 -0.02
Italy 0.42 0.13 -0.29 Spain 0.24 0.22 -0.02
Canada 0.50 0.25 -0.25 Switzerland 0.36 0.34 -0.02
Sweden 1.03 0.80 -0.23 No change
Australia 0.46 0.27 -0.19 United Kingdom 0.32 0.32 0.00
Netherlands 0.98 0.84 -0.14 Rise
Belgium 0.48 0.36 -0.12 Denmark 1.02 1.06 0.04
United States 0.21 0.10 -0.11 Ireland 0.20 0.30 0.10
Austria 0.33 0.23 -0.10 Portugal 0.11 0.26 0.15
Luxembourg 0.33 0.71 0.38
Recent DAC member
Greece na 0.20 na
DAC Total 0.34 0.22 -0.12
Source: OECD/DAC on-line database and Hjertholm (1999).
Table 3
Bilateral donor shares in total aid, 1966-2000 (period averages, per cent)
1966-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-2000
France 13 11 12 14 11
Germany 8 12 11 12 11
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden
4 12 13 14 16
Japan 5 10 16 20 22
Italy, Portugal and Spain 2 2 6 8 7
United Kingdom 7 8 6 5 7
United States 54 32 25 18 17
Others 7 13 11 10 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source:  OECD/DAC: Development Cooperation Report, for various years.
7Table 4
 Net ODA disbursements, by type, all donors, 1971-2000 (period averages, per cent)
1971-80 1981-90 1991-98 1999-2000
ODA type
ODA grants 61.9 71.1 77.8 90.6
ODA loans 38.1 28.9 22.2 9.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Donor
Bilateral ODA 78.7 75.4 70.6 66.9
Multilateral ODA 21.3 24.6 29.4 33.1
o/w IBRD and IDA 5.4 7.8 8.8 na
IMF (SAF and ESAF) 0.0 0.0 1.1 na
United Nations agencies 7.4 8.7 7.6 8.0
CEC 3.3 4.3 8.1 8.7
Other 5.2 3.8 3.8 na
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Hjertholm (1999) and OECD/DAC on-line database.
Two long-run trends have continued in recent years, these being the increase in the
share of multilateral aid and the proportion of aid which is grants (Table 4). The latter is
dealt with below when the terms of aid are discussed. Multilateral aid has risen from
one-fifth to a third of the total. The impetus for this increase in the 1970s and 1980s was
the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in financing the response of developing
countries to first the oil price shocks and then the debt crisis,8 reinforced in the 1970s by
the expansion of the World Bank under the presidency of Robert McNamara. For
European countries, an additional factor has been the increase in the size of the aid
programme of the European Union, which has gone from just over three per cent of total
aid in the 1970s to nearly nine per cent in the most recent years; for EU members this
share rose from 11 to 20 per cent from 1989-90 to 2000. But a further factor underlying
the rising multilateral share in the 1990s has been the shrinking aid programme.9
Two pieces of evidence support the link between changes in the overall level of aid and
the multilateral share. The first is looking at the link between the change in the
multilateral share and the percentage change in aid volume (these data are given in
Appendix Table A.2). There is a negative relationship between these two variables.10
Countries with falling aid all experienced a rising multilateral share (with the very
minor exception of Australia which had a negligible change in both variables); the
                                                
8 The increase from these factors in the 1970s was greatest in official development finance since the
largest part was from non-concessional IMF resources.
9 During the 1990s bilateral donors took a greater burden in debt refinancing operations, so that a
reverse in the trend toward greater multilateralism may have been expected. Clearly, this influence has
been more than offset by other influences, which I argue are the EU programme and declining aid
volumes.
10 There are potentially influential points at both ends of the distribution. However, they do not influence
the results as these points of high leverage are consistent with the general pattern of the data. Similar
results are obtained using both transformed and untransformed versions of the X variable.
8country with the largest increase in multilateral share (Italy) also had the largest fall in
total aid. Of the three countries with large reductions in the multilateral share, two
(Ireland and Luxembourg) experienced very substantial increases in their aid
programme. The significance of this relationship is born out by the regression results
shown in Table 5.11
It thus seems that the multilateral component appears as a fixed cost in the aid
programme, whose share rises as volume falls. This finding may be partly explained by
the fact that multilateral contributions are calculated by some formula for burden
sharing (e.g. IBRD and EU). But this argument does not apply to all contributions;
many of those, such as to parts of the UN system, are voluntary. For voluntary
contributions the argument must be that there is an inertia in the size of multilateral
contributions which protects them at a time of cuts.
Table 5
Regressions of determinants of multilateral share
Levels regression Difference regression
Dependent variable:
Multilateral share (2000)
Dependent variable:
Change in multilateral share (1993-2000)
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
Intercept 33.7 7.6 Intercept 59.9 3.9
EU dummy 14.4 3.3 Dummy for joining EU during period 1.6 0.4
Aid to GNP ratio -18.1 -2.3 Change in aid (%) -28.0 -3.8
R2 = 0.42 n = 22 R2 = 0.45 n = 21
Notes: Dummy for EU membership also tried and also insignificant. Regressor is transformed as
log (100+x), which does not greatly change results but yields improved R2.
Source: Estimated from data in Table A.2.
Table 6
 Allocation of DAC aid to multilateral agencies
Total EU Non-EU
1980 1990 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
World Bank 36 31 21 29 15 41 30
   o/w IDA 34 27 21 28 14 39 29
United Nations 24 26 29 22 22 26 39
EU 17 19 28 38 50 0 0
Regional Development Banks (a 19 14 12 9 8 26 18
Other 5 10 9 2 5 7 13
Note: (a For 1980 and 1990 this is total for IDB, ADB and AfDB, which account for 97 per cent of the
total in 2000.
Source: OECD/DAC: Development Cooperation Report, for various years.
                                                
11 The significance of this relationship is robust to changes in the sample which remove the points of
high leverage. The slope with Ireland and Luxembourg remains significant and is little changed (the
DFBETA is 0.44).
9Table 5 also shows results on determinants of the level of the multilateral share. This
share is negatively associated with a donor’s aid to GNP ratio: the larger the aid
programme then the more is left over for the bilateral programme once multilateral
contributions are taken care of.12 The dummy for being a member of the EU is also
significant in the regression: being a member of the EU significantly raises the share of
a country’s aid devoted to multilateral organizations. That is, EU membership crowds
out the bilateral aid programme. It is less clear that EU membership has a similar
crowding out effect on other multilateral support. Whilst the value of EU contributions
has risen for all member states, even those for which total multilateral contributions are
falling, the regression results show changing multilateral share not to be associated with
EU membership.
Table 6 sheds further light on the issue by showing the breakdown of contributions to
multilateral agencies from DAC donors. The main change has been the reduction in
contributions to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), especially the World Bank
and, of the regional development banks, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
For EU donors the increase has been to the benefit of the EU. But the MDBs’ share has
also fallen for non-EU donors, which have seen a corresponding rise in contributions to
the UN.
There are also interesting patterns in the donor-level data (Tables A.5a-c). Most striking
is the regional orientation of contributions to the MDBs. The US is the main supporter
of IDB and Japan of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The former colonial powers,
France and the UK, are amongst the main contributors to the African Development
Bank (ADB).
3.1 Trends in other official flows (OOF)
Other official flows have not declined as has ODA, but experienced a modest rise in the
last decade (Table 7). But there have been substantial changes in the nature of these
flows. OOF has always been over-whelmingly bilateral, and this continues to be the
Table 7
Breakdown of OOF by type
1970-79 1980-89 1990-2000
Bilateral 95 99 92
 o/w Export-related 50 2 12
Joint venture 20 10 14
Debt rescheduling 18 74 16
 Securities and claims 8 12 49
Multilateral 5 1 8
Total 100 100 100
Memo item
Average per annum (US$ billions) 3.28 6.06 7.57
Source: OECD/DAC on-line database.
                                                
12 However, these results are not that robust. The negative relationship depends in large part, though not
entirely, on the fact that Greece and Italy have low aid shares but high multilateral volumes.
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case. During the 1970s and 1990s, debt rescheduling was less than one-fifth of OOF,
but swelled to three-quarters in the 1980s. In the 1970s export-related flows (subsidies)
accounted for half of OOF, but this position has been taken by securities in the last
decade.
4 Other measures of aid performance
In addition to aid volume, aid performance is measured with reference to geographical
allocation, the terms of that aid and the percentage which is untied. Donor comparisons
using these variables have been made by White and Woestman (1994) and updated in
Hjertholm and White (2000). This study provides a further update, with a focus on
recent developments.
4.1 The geographical allocation of aid
The allocation of aid can be considered in a purely descriptive manner, identifying
which regions and countries receive aid, or in a more analytical manner, attempting to
explain or evaluate aid allocations. The analytical approach is pursued in the paper by
Berthélemy and Tichit (2002). The discussion here is more descriptive.
4.1.1 Allocation by region and country
Table 8 shows the regional allocation of aid. The left-hand side shows these data as
usually presented by DAC, that is, as a percentage of total aid. Some trends are evident
from these figures, notably continued decline in the share for both the Middle East and
South and Central Asia. The share of both Europe and Far East Asia has gone up. In the
latter case this increase results from rapidly growing aid programmes in China and,
more recently, Vietnam. These large programmes should be expected to remain in place
for some time. On the other hand, the increase to Europe reflects response to
emergencies in the region, so that aid to the region will fall back, should the
emergencies not continue. South America’s share remains low. Having risen throughout
the 1980s, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen back. The falling share for
Sub-Saharan Africa has taken place for both bilateral and multilateral donors, though
this has been most marked amongst the latter (Appendix Table A.3). Similarly, the
rising share of aid to Europe has been strongest for multilateral agencies, from virtually
nothing in 1990 to 13 per cent in 2000, though as noted above, this may be partly a
temporary phenomenon.
Overall, the fall in Sub-Saharan Africa’s share matches the rising share of Europe. For
European donors in particular, European recipients now feature among the top ten
recipients, whereas they did not do so ten years earlier. For example, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are now among the top recipients of
aid from Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (all of whom have seen a reduction in their
share of aid going to Africa of more than 10 per cent), whereas they did not feature ten
years ago. In addition, Palestine has become a more important recipient for many
donors. Finally, the largest drop in the share going to Sub-Saharan Africa was for
Portugal, for whom East Timor has become the second most important recipient.
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The right-hand side of Table 8, showing per capita allocations, illustrates some more
striking patterns. The first is the considerable disparity in aid per capita, which is
explained both by differences in income but also by country size. There is a small
country bias by which small countries get more aid per capita than large ones, so a
region with lots of small countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific)
will get more aid per capita than a region with a few large countries (South America), or
a region with even one very large country (China in East Asia and India in South Asia).
The second striking pattern is a general one of falling receipts of real aid per capita
(with minor exceptions). In the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa has been triply hit by a
falling share of a shrinking aid budget compounded by a growing population, resulting
in a drop of real aid per capita of over 40 per cent between 1990 and 2000.
Other official flows have displayed a similar pattern with even sharper trends (Table 9).
Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for just over 30 per cent of these flows in the 1970s,
increasing to 30 per cent when debt relief dominated OOF (see above), but collapsed to
5 per cent in the 1990s. Part II countries, which did not exist as a category prior to the
1990s, took over one-third of these flows. Several Part II countries were formerly
classified under Europe, whose share has fallen as a result.
Table 8
Regional allocation of net ODA, 1980-2000 (share and per capita)
Share (% of total aid) Per capita (US$)
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
North Africa 8.1 12.4 4.3 42 68 18
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.5 30.9 25.3 27 38 22
South America 2.4 3.6 4.7 5 8 8
Middle East 15.9 8.2 4.6 76 40 16
South & Central Asia 16.7 10.6 11.5 8 5 4
Far East Asia 7.8 12.1 15.4 3 5 5
Other 26.7 22.2 34.3 66 60 72
    of which Europe 3.6 2.5 7.4 19 16 43
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 14 15 12
Memo item:
Real ODA (US$ billion, 1999 prices) 46 60 56
Sources: Calculated from OECD/DAC on-line database; Hjertholm (1999) and World Bank (2002).
Table 9
Regional allocation of OOF
1970-79 1980-89 1990-2000
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.9 29.6 5.6
Western Hemisphere 23.1 38.5 11.1
South and Central Asia -2.1 2.3 4.2
Middle East and North Africa 18.6 12.8 11.2
Europe 20.8 2.5 0.8
Asia and Pacific 28.6 14.4 30.6
Part II countries 0.0 0.0 36.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD/DAC on-line database.
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4.1.2 Allocation by income group
Table 10 shows the allocation of aid by income group. There are several ways in which
the allocation of aid may be described (see White and McGillivray 1995 for a review).
The headcount-based share going to poor countries is far from being the best measure,
but it is that which DAC reports.13 The most striking result from Table 10 is that the
progressive redistribution of aid which took place since the 1970s in multilateral aid and
during the 1980s for bilateral aid has been reversed in the 1990s. In 1973, just over half
of all aid went to low-income countries, with nearly a fifth being received by high-
income and upper middle-income countries. By 1990 no aid was being received by
high-income countries, though the share going to upper middle-income countries has
remained resilient at around 5 per cent. In earlier decades the share of aid to middle and
high-income countries fell to the benefit of low-income recipients. But in the 1990s, the
share of low-income countries has fallen back by around 10 per cent,14 the share of
lower middle-income countries rising back up by a similar amount for bilateral donors.
A similar ‘swap’ can be seen for multilateral donors, with a larger magnitude involved.
Such a trend can be explained in part by aid recipients graduating from the low-income
to the low-middle income country category. Such improvements present donors with a
dilemma. Withdrawing aid from good performers as they no longer need it can send the
wrong signal and so create adverse incentives. In practice, donors have been slow and
reluctant to phase out aid, only doing so when a country’s fortunes are very well
established. Botswana provides a good example of a country which continued to receive
aid despite relatively high-income, but no longer gets that much, and Cape Verde an
example which continues to receive aid. Failing to graduate good performers off aid at a
time of falling real aid budgets means that the neediest countries are receiving a smaller
slice of a shrinking cake. These patterns can be observed in both bilateral and
multilateral ODA.
Table 10
Allocation of bilateral and multilateral ODA by income groups
Low-income
countries
Low middle-
income countries
Upper middle- and
high-income countries Total
Memo: total net
ODA (billions US$)
Bilateral (DAC total)
1971 57 26 17 100 5.5
1981 55 19 25 100 16.1
1990 71 21 8 100 31.1
2000 62 34 4 100 25.0
Multilateral
1971 54 25 21 100 1.1
1981 79 13 8 100 7.0
1990 88 10 2 100 11.8
2000 71 24 5 100 11.8
Note: Per cent as share of total allocated funds.
Source: OECD/DAC: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, for various
years.
                                                
13 White and McGillivray (1995) report time series of other measures for selected donors until the
early 1990s.
14 Not shown in the data presented here is the fact that this decline has fallen on the least developed
countries.
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4.1.3 Aid concentration
A further aspect of donor allocation is the concentration of the aid programme in a
restricted number of countries. There are good developmental grounds for concentrating
the assistance of any one donor on a few countries. First, the staff of the agency, and the
consultants working for them, build up expertise on a particular country. Second,
concentration will reduce donor proliferation in developing countries, by which the
scarce time and skills of government are taken up in satisfying the multiple demands of
many different donors. In recognition of this problem several donors have at various
times sought to concentrate their aid on fewer countries. Sweden has recently decided to
focus its bilateral programme on just 18 countries. The Netherlands has taken several
initiatives over the last thirty years to concentrate its aid, but proliferation always creeps
back in.
Arguments for concentration should not be confused with those for selectivity, which is
the view that aid should be focused on countries which donors deem to have ‘good
policies’. This view has been advanced most strongly in the World Bank’s Assessing
Aid report (World Bank 1998), and the Collier-Dollar aid allocation model (1998).
Whilst selectivity has been a factor in recent moves toward aid concentration (though
not those in the past) it is not without its problems (for a critique see Lensink and White
2000).
Table 11 reports various measures of the concentration of donor assistance, using a
period average of DAC data for the five years 1991-96. For each donor the data include
every country which received aid from that donor in those five years, though not
necessarily in every year.15 Six measures are given. The first measure is simply the
number of countries receiving any aid at all, with two subsequent measures of the
numbers getting over one and five per cent of that donors aid. Three further measures
report the share of the donor’s aid accounted for by the top one, three and ten recipients.
The results for bilateral and multilateral donors are interestingly different. Bilateral
donors are discussed first.
For DAC as a whole, 175 recipients are listed, which is thus the maximum any one
donor may give aid to. No donor gives aid to less than 100 recipients, and the most are
France and Japan at 160 and 161 respectively. These numbers are so large since some
there are many countries with very small aid programmes, benefiting from a handful of
scholarships or a small grants programme run by the Embassy. Hence the second
measure is the number of countries having an aid programme in excess of one per cent
of that donor’s total aid. A concentrated programme will have few such countries, the
least being 16 for New Zealand and the most being 36 in the case of Switzerland. A
cut-off of 5 per cent is also used. However, once the cut-off is increased, then the
relationship with concentration is reversed. To see this, suppose that the cut-off were
49 per cent, then a very concentrated programme would have a value of 2 (countries),
though all donors would in fact have a value of 0. Donors whose aid appears to be
concentrated by the other measures tend to have a higher value for this measure. The
next three measures show the share of aid to the top recipient, top three and top 10. For
most donors, between one-half to three-quarters of aid goes to their top ten recipients,
though it is as little as one-third for The Netherlands.
                                                
15 Negative net flows are also shown, so the data include a few cases of net outflows in the period.
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Table 11
Measure of the concentration of donor aid, 1991-96
No. of countries receiving aid Share in donor’s aid of:
At all >1% >5%
of donor allocation
Top
recipient
Top 3
recipients
Top 10
recipients
Bilateral
Australia 130 18 4 35 54 77
United States 128 17 2 25 51 68
Austria 130 19 4 22 47 72
New Zealand 104 16 8 13 33 73
Ireland 105 20 5 14 38 71
Denmark 100 23 5 14 30 62
Japan 161 22 5 14 35 62
Finland 111 24 5 10 24 58
Norway 122 27 4 11 28 54
Sweden 133 28 4 9 24 54
United Kingdom 151 24 3 10 22 51
Belgium 133 29 4 10 25 50
France 160 26 5 9 24 53
Canada 143 34 3 8 23 47
Germany 154 33 2 9 22 40
Switzerland 123 36 2 6 15 38
Netherlands 141 33 2 6 11 34
DAC total 175 30 2 8 19 39
Multilateral
ADB (ADF) 48 30 3 12 23 51
World Bank (IDA) 68 2 0 3 6 10
UNDP 162 32 2 7 17 33
EU (ED) 164 34 0 5 13 30
Multilateral total 173 29 2 6 16 37
Note: Shares are calculated from total of that donor’s aid allocation on a country basis.
Source: Calculated from data from OECD/DAC on-line database.
Table 11 ranks countries according to how concentrated is their aid taking into account
the different measures. The main conclusion from this analysis is that aid is not
concentrated. The strong developmental rationale for concentrating aid is clearly
outweighed by the political and commercial pressures for a more diffuse aid programme
(see Mosley [1986] for a discussion of these pressures). Various hypotheses may be
advanced as to why some donors’ aid is more concentrated than others. First, one may
expect the aid of small donors to be more concentrated. This is to some extent true,
though the US also appears as very concentrated, by virtue of the fact it gave nearly half
its aid to just two countries (Israel and Egypt). Second, it may be expected that countries
with ties to many former colonies, notably the UK and France, would have diffuse aid
programmes. This is indeed true—but countries with few or no ex-colonies also have
diffuse aid. Finally, it may be thought that those countries with a strong ‘development
lobby’ would have more successfully resisted pressures against aid concentration. This
also does not seem to be the case. The Netherlands, where public interest in aid is high
and which has indeed made repeated efforts to concentrate its aid, is the most diffuse of
all.
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Multilateral aid has three striking differences with the allocation of bilateral aid. First,
some multilaterals have a restricted mandate in one of two ways: (i) they may be
geographically restricted, as for the regional development banks, such as the African
Development Bank shown in the table, and (ii) concessional (i.e. ODA) flows may be
restricted to low-income countries, as for the ADF window of the ADB and the World
Bank’s IDA window. These restricted mandates mean that aid is more concentrated
since it is given to fewer countries.16 But, second, for multilaterals not having restricted
mandates of this sort, then aid goes to a very large number of countries, as shown by the
cases of the UNDP and EU. Finally, multilateral agencies usually work with an
allocation rule taking into account recipient income and population, which prevents
them having ‘favourites’ which take a large share of their aid, so that the shares going to
the top recipients are much lower for multilateral donors than for bilateral ones. For
IDA and the EU, no recipient takes more than 5 per cent of their total net aid. On the
other hand there are two countries having more than 5 per cent of total multilateral aid;
these are China and India, which is to be an expected result for any sensible allocation
rule.17
One reason for supporting concentration is that diffuse aid programmes result in donor
proliferation. Proliferation means that government agencies have to deal with many
donors, spending their time in meeting the dozen or so visiting missions each month,
and their accounting systems having to accommodate numerous different sets of
procurement and disbursement regulations and their officers having to comply with
various reporting requirements at different times. These problems may also be
overcome by improved donor coordination. Such coordination has long been an ideal
that has failed to be realised. But three developments over the last decade have led to
some improvements and recent developments may leave one cautiously optimistic. First
has been the increased use of programme aid by bilateral donors in support of World
Bank structural adjustment programmes. Bilateral programme aid is almost invariably
linked to World Bank or IMF programmes, which immediately introduces one element
of coordination (see White and Dijkstra, forthcoming). If the bilateral funds are joint co-
finance (i.e. given to the World Bank to spend on behalf of the bilateral) then the funds
are also subject to the same procedures. However, if the funds are parallel co-finance
(disbursed alongside the World Bank funds) then they may utilize different procedures.
But there have been efforts to coordinate these procedures, which have been especially
successful in Sub-Saharan Africa under the auspices of the Special Programme for
Africa (now called the Strategic Partnership with Africa, SPA). Second has been the rise
of the sector approach, by which donors should coordinate their aid within a
government-led programme, with a large proportion of these funds being budget support
using harmonized procedures. Experience with the approach has been mixed thus far,
but its popularity continues to spread (see Foster 2000 and White 2001). Finally, to
access debt relief, countries are required to produce a poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP) and it is likely that all low-income countries will be encouraged to follow suit.
In principle, the aid of all donors should be consistent with that, and donors are trying to
at least link their new country strategies with the PRSP. If such mechanisms work as
planned, then the framework provided by the PRSP (within which sector programmes
                                                
16 Only low-income countries are eligible for soft-loans from the World Bank. There is also an income
threshold for the hard, IBRD window, which falls in the middle of the upper middle-income range.
Hence not all countries on Part I of the DAC list are eligible for World Bank funds.
17 On prescriptive rules for donor allocations see McGillivray et al. (2002).
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are embedded) should provide coordination in the allocation of funds, though does not
guarantee it insofar as procedures are concerned.
4.1.4 The allocation of official aid
Since ODA has fallen on account of the rise of OA, it is worth mentioning the distribution
of these other funds. Table 12 shows the net OA to the main recipients of OA, ranked by
their share of the total in 2000. There are two types of country on the list. Predominant are
those of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries. Such countries
constitute, with one exception, the top twelve recipients of OA, with the largest two, Russia
and Poland, getting just under 20 per cent each of the total in 2000. The other group on the
list are those countries who have been placed on DAC’s Part II list. Most notable is Israel,
accounting for 10 per cent of OA. But also included are high-income countries such as the
Bahamas and Brunei which still receive some aid funds.
Table 12
Major recipients of official aid, 1991-2000 (US$ million)
1991 1995 2000 Share in 2000 (%)
Russia 563.5 1,610.1 1,564.6 19.5
Poland 2,508.3 3,790.4 1,396.2 17.4
Israel na na 800.0 10.0
Ukraine 368.3 319.1 541.0 6.7
Czech Republic 230.6 147.9 438.2 5.5
Romania 321.1 275.6 432.1 5.4
Bulgaria 316.1 113.7 311.1 3.9
Hungary 626.0 -244.0 252.2 3.1
Slovak Republic 114.5 98.2 113.1 1.4
Lithuania 4.0 179.6 99.0 1.2
Latvia 3.4 63.6 91.1 1.1
Estonia 15.4 58.2 63.8 0.8
Cyprus na na 54.5 0.7
Belarus 187.0 222.9 39.6 0.5
Bahamas na na 5.5 0.1
Singapore na na 1.1 0.0
Brunei na na 0.6 0.0
Qatar na na 0.5 0.0
Other 1,316.0 1,782.0 1,816.0 22.6
Total 6,574.2 8,417.3 8,020.2 100.0
Source: OECD/DAC: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, for various
years.
4.2 Financial terms and conditions
Two components make up the grant element of aid (GE): the share which is loans (L)
and the concessionality of that loan component (GEL). Algebraically:
GE = 100 (1 – L) + L GEL
The grant element of the loan depends on the interest charge and the maturity and grace
period of the loan. DAC has a norm that the grant element of aid should be 86.6, which
is met by all donors, although only just by Japan (GE = 88.6). However, countries with
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low aid volumes18 are deemed not to have met the target, which in 2000 disqualified
Italy and the US.
There has been a historical trend toward improved terms and conditions, which, as
Tables 4 and 13 show, has been strongly accentuated in recent years. Rising
concessionality has historically been associated with a rising grant share. By 1989-90
the aid of six bilateral donors was entirely aid finance and so had a grant element of 100
per cent (Appendix Table A.4), and another six had a grant element of close to 100 per
cent (five over 99 per cent and the US at 98.3 per cent). The improvement in the grant
element of DAC ODA at the end of the last decade thus came about from improvements
in the donors whose financial terms were still relatively poor ten years earlier. At that
time, four countries were not meeting the terms target and two were barely doing so–
compared to the case in which they all do today (discounting the disqualifications).
The continued and dramatic improvement in the terms of aid in the 1990s has thus come
about by those donors still having a substantial non-grant component of their aid
programme in 1990 reducing the share of loans, and improving the concessionality of
what loans they do have. This has been the case for each of these donors, namely
Austria, Japan, Spain and Portugal. It is also so for France and Germany which were
already nearer the emerging ‘norm’ of 98 per cent or more.
Multilateral aid has a large concessional component since UN funds are entirely grants.
The usual windows of the World Bank, multilateral development banks and IMF are
non-concesssional and do not qualify as ODA. However, all of these institutions have
concessional facilities for low-income countries, such as the World Bank’s IDA and the
Fund’s ESAF, recently replaced by the PRGF. Whilst these are very soft loans (with
grant elements of around 70 per cent), they are nonetheless loans which have to be
repaid. It is far from clear that recipients should borrow programme aid funds to pay
external debt, or that money borrowed to pay technical assistance or for social sector
activities will generate the necessary revenue for repayment. A review of the IFIs
recommended that World Bank resources to low-income countries should be in the form
of grants (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission 2000), and in 2001
President Bush stated that at least half of World Bank funds to Africa should be grants.
These calls have been resisted by other donors and the Bank itself. This is an area to
which aid campaigners could usefully devote some energies.
Table 13
Bilateral commitments, data on financial terms, DAC donors 1971-98 (period averages)
1971-80 1981-90 1991-1998 1999-2000
Grant share of ODA 33.9 55.0 52.0 76.2
Loan share of ODA 66.1 45.0 48.0 23.8
Grant element of ODA loans 61.0 55.4 59.9 71.0
Grant element of total ODA 74.3 80.0 80.5 95.4
Source: Hjertholm (1999) and Appendix Table A.4.
                                                
18 Defined as ‘commitments as a percentage of GNI significantly below the DAC average’.
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4.4 Aid tying
Aid tying has various means. The most common, which is that mainly pursued here,
refers to the practice of linking aid to the procurement of goods and services from the
donor country. However, it has also been taken to mean linking the use of aid to
particular projects and to making aid conditional on implementing agreed policy
changes. The bulk of aid has always had, and continues to have, its intended use
specified by the donor. Programme aid, defined by the donor as aid not linked to a
specific project, is around 10 per cent of total ODA (Table 15). This proportion has
fallen since the 1970s, since US food aid under PL480 was also largely programme aid,
with the funds raised from the sale of the food available to the government. Food aid’s
share of total aid has fallen from around 15 per cent in the 1970s to less than 5 per cent
today, with much of it being used in ‘food for work’ programmes, i.e. as project aid. By
the 1980s, financial programme aid was more important than food programme aid, and
was increasingly linked to policy change. By the 1990s most bilateral donors were also
giving programme aid linked to policy reform. Moreover, the scope of these reforms has
spread over time, from macro stabilization to market liberalization and then onto the
allocation of spending. By the late 1980s governance concerns were starting to be raised
and became an established part of conditionality in the early to mid-1990s. And now the
increased use of the sector approach introduces a policy dialogue framework for many
activities previously restricted to the project level.
Table 14
Share of untied aid, 1980-2000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Average
1995-2000
Sorted in descending order for average for 1995-2000
Portugal na na na 98.1 98.2 98.2
Luxembourg na na na na 96.7 96.7
Switzerland 60.7 67.3 63 91.3 93.6 92.5
Japan 25.8 60.8 77.0 96.3 86.4 91.4
Sweden 83.5 68.8 78.5 93.9 85.4 89.7
United Kingdom 25.2 27.6 na 86.2 91.5 88.9
Norway 68.9 70.3 61.3 77.0 97.7 87.4
Netherlands 55.9 60.3 51.2 78.9 95.3 87.1
Belgium 25.7 37.5 na na 85.7 85.7
Finland 37.2 80.8 27.4 75.8 89.5 82.7
Australia 66.4 53.4 15.8 na 77.4 77.4
Germany 82.2 63.7 43.6 60.3 93.2 76.8
Denmark 57.6 60.4 na 61.3 80.5 70.9
France 43.3 42.5 47.1 58.4 68.0 63.2
Italy 26.3 16.6 16.6 59.8 38.2 49.0
Spain na na na na 47.2 47.2
Austria 0.7 3.0 38.8 25.0 59.2 42.1
Canada 10 42.3 38.8 31.5 24.9 28.2
United States 26.8 40.9 69.5 27.3 na 27.3
Greece na na na na 23.5 23.5
No data for 1995-00
Ireland na 100 na na na na
New Zealand 48.4 78 100 na na na
DAC donors total 44.1 47.3 59.4 69.6 81.1 75.4
Source: Hjertholm (1999) and OECD/DAC: Development Cooperation Report, for 2001.
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In the procurement sense, aid is said to be partially tied if the list of supplier countries is
restricted, but extends beyond the donor. In principle, all aid from EU countries should
now be at most partially tied since agencies are required to ensure firms from all
member countries can bid. As is the case for the financial terms of aid, DAC has long
had targets for untying, but these have had little or no impact on the continued practice
of tying. But the 1990s saw a change, with several donors making step changes in the
proportion of their aid which is untied. For example, this proportion rose for the UK
from 35 per cent in 1993, to 45 per cent the next year and 86 per cent in 1995. The
White Paper on International Development of the labour government which came to
power in 1997 announced the abolition of the aid and trade provision (ATP),19 and the
second White Paper (published in November 2000) the intention to abolish aid tying
altogether.
As Table 14 shows, many other donors have made considerable progress with untying.
By 2000, over 90 per cent of aid was untied for seven donors, and over 80 per cent for
over five more. In every case, these figures represent a considerable move toward
untying compared to the situation in 1980. However, the case of the UK
notwithstanding, this does not mean that untying is here to stay. The values attained in
2000 are not a peak for nearly all countries. There are only three countries for which the
percentage of aid which was untied in 2000 was higher than a previous year shown,
compared to ten  for which it was lower, and seven for which share was the same. The
DAC total peaked at nearly 88 per cent in 1997, so that the figure of 81 per cent in 2000
is in fact a considerable decline. The reversal has been greatest amongst northern
European donors (Austria, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Germany), which saw big
increases in untying in the first part of 1990s but then dropped back.
Three questions thus arise: (i) why has untying become more prevalent since the
1990s?, (ii) is the improvement permanent?, (iii) and, if not, why not? One possible
reason for the increase in untying is that the form of aid has changed to aid which is less
easily tied. Debt relief and budget support (programme aid) cannot be tied to donor
imports by definition. Import support (also programme aid) could of course be tied, but
the strong evidence that doing so delayed disbursement (see White and Dijkstra,
forthcoming) helped the tendency to harmonize donor import support procedures during
the 1990s with the implication that tying would be less. However, as Table 15 shows,
the share of programme aid and debt relief in fact fell slightly in the 1990s. A similar
argument can be made with respect to emergency aid (though some emergency aid is
tied, by virtue of being surplus disposal). Whilst the share of emergency aid has been
increasing, it remains too small to account for any but a small part of reduced aid tying.
An alternative argument is that the type of aid given has become less import-intensive,
funding locally built schools and nurses salaries rather than imported machinery and
technical assistance. The data in Table 15 do not bear out the former argument. Support
to production sectors has fallen,20 but that to economic infrastructure risen by about the
same amount. There is no evidence that reliance on technical assistance is declining, its
share of ODA having increased rather than fallen. Hence it seems likely that the
increase in untying is ‘real’, in that it reflects the untying of previously tied transactions.
                                                
19 ATP was the UK’s mixed credits programme, which combined a grant with a non-concessional loan,
the whole lot being tied.
20 This fall reflecting the change in donor attitudes toward the state’s role in development.
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Table 15
ODA commitments by sector and purpose, DAC donors, 1971-2000
1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000
Social infrastructure and services 22.6 25.0 27.9
Economic infrastructure and services 12.6 18.7 20.0
Production sectors 19.1 19.7 10.8
Multisector (crosscutting) 1.8 3.0 5.6
Commodity aid and general programme aid 16.5 16.2 9.2
Action related to debt 4.4 4.3 8.8
Emergency assistance 1.1 1.7 6.2
Administrative costs of donors na 2.6 4.8
Support to NGOs na 1.5 1.5
Unallocated/unspecified 22.0 7.1 5.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Hjertholm (1999) and OECD/DAC on-line database.
5 Conclusions
A number of findings emerge from this review. The most important of these are as
follows. First, real aid declined in the 1990s. Whilst the fall has levelled off, there is no
sign of aid returning to the levels achieved in the early part of the last decade. Recent
calls to double aid volume would, if carried out, achieve this—but not bring total aid to
much above half of the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. The second main finding is
that, at the same time as aid has been falling, there has been a regressive shift in the
allocation of aid away from some of the poorest countries. This shift has largely been
driven by a shift of aid from European donors toward European aid recipients, though it
is also accounted for by increased assistance to other ‘troubled areas’. As a result, real
aid per capita to Sub-Saharan Africa has dropped by 40 per cent during the 1990s.
Thirdly, the multilateral share of aid has continued to rise, fuelled in part by falling aid
budgets and also the growth of European Union aid. The expanding EU aid programme
has crowded out the bilateral element of European donors’ aid programmes.
Turning to other measures of donor performance, it has been shown that aid is generally
very diffuse: no bilateral donor gave aid to less that 100 countries in the first part of the
1990s and most gave 20 or more recipients a significant amount of aid. Multilateral aid
is, by contrast, rather more concentrated. Both the financial terms of aid and aid tying
have seen improvements in the 1990s. A very large proportion of bilateral aid is now in
the form of grants, and all donors meet the DAC norm that the overall grant element
should be 86 per cent (though two donors are deemed not to have met the condition on
account of their low aid volume). This improvement reinforces a long-run trend. There
has also been a shift to greater untying, though this seems less firmly established. Whilst
there was untying in the 1980s, the extent in the 1990s has been greater but also shows
some signs of being reversed. Since untying is consistent with the market-based
development promoted by donors, aid campaigners should be on solid ground in
attempting to protect the gains that have been made.
Whilst there are many important dimensions of aid which are not mentioned here, most
significantly the quality of the aid-financed activities themselves, the aspects mentioned
here are also of great importance to developing countries. Developing countries have
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restricted access to international capital and many continue to be plagued by problems
of debt, so a substantial, growing grant-based aid programme is necessary to assist their
development.21 Aid should be focused on poorer countries, with aid to less poor
countries well targeted to reach the poor in those countries. And good terms must be
preserved, increasing concessionality by moving multilateral bank soft-loan windows to
a grant basis and protecting the trend toward untying.
                                                
21 It is not being maintained that aid is sufficient to ensure development. The conditions under which aid
will work or not are beyond the scope of this study.
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Appendix: additional tables
Appendix Table A.1
Composition of official development finance, 1993 and 2000
US$ billions (current) Shares of total ODF Shares within category
1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000
ODA Bilateral 39.4 36.0 47.8 54.9 71.0 72.7
Multilateral 16.1 13.5 19.5 20.6 29.0 27.3
Total 55.5 49.5 67.3 75.5 100.0 100.0
Official Aid Bilateral 5.2 4.9 6.3 7.5 88.1 62.8
Multilateral 0.7 2.9 0.8 4.4 11.9 37.2
Total 5.9 7.8 7.2 11.9 100.0 100.0
Other ODF Bilateral 11.4 -1.4 13.8 -2.1 54.0 -16.9
Multilateral 9.7 9.7 11.8 14.8 46.0 116.9
Total 21.1 8.3 25.6 12.7 100.0 100.0
Total ODF Bilateral 56.0 39.5 67.9 60.2 67.9 60.2
Multilateral 26.5 26.1 32.1 39.8 32.1 39.8
Total 82.5 65.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD/DAC: Development Cooperation Report, for 2001.
Appendix Table A.2(a)
Net bilateral and multilateral ODA by donor, 1989-90 and 2000 (US$ millions)
1989-90 2000
Bilateral Multilateral EU Total Bilateral Multilateral EU Total
Australia 730 258 – 988 758 229 – 987
Austria 250 88 – 338 257 167 87 424
Belgium 452 344 116 796 437 323 218 760
Canada 1,636 759 – 2,395 1,160 583 – 1,743
Denmark 609 445 65 1,054 1,024 641 93 1,665
Finland 467 310 – 777 241 176 57 417
France 5,050 1,433 696 6,483 2,829 1,276 792 4,105
Germany 3,827 1,807 759 5,634 2,687 2,343 1,242 5,030
Greece – – – – 79 115 91 194
Ireland 21 32 22 53 155 80 47 235
Italy 2,151 1,534 421 3,685 377 999 638 1,376
Japan 6,782 2,234 – 9,016 10,476 4,848 – 15,324
Luxembourg 14 8 5 22 93 33 15 126
Netherlands 1,672 644 183 2,316 2,243 892 233 3,135
New Zealand 79 12 – 91 101 33 – 134
Norway 655 406 – 1,061 934 330 – 1,264
Portugal 91 35 25 126 179 92 59 271
Spain 449 304 170 753 829 534 367 1,363
Sweden 1,327 576 – 1,903 1,242 557 83 1,799
Switzerland 487 167 – 654 627 263 – 890
United Kingdom 1,468 1,144 543 2,612 2,710 1,792 975 4,502
United States 7,597 1,939 – 9,536 7,405 2,550 – 9,955
DAC Total 35,812 14,300 3,005 50,112 36,043 17,694 4,954 53,737
Memo items
EU members 17,848 8,704 3,005 26,552 15,382 10,020 4,997 25,402
EU members
 in 1989–90
15,804 7,730 3,005 23,534 13,563 9,005 4,679 22,568
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Appendix Table A.2(b)
Net bilateral and multilateral ODA by donor, 1989-90 and 2000 (% of total)
1989-90 2000
Bilateral Multilateral EU Total Bilateral Multilateral EU Total
Australia 73.9 26.1 0.0 100.0 76.8 23.2 0.0 100.0
Austria 74.0 26.0 0.0 100.0 60.6 39.4 20.5 100.0
Belgium 56.8 43.2 14.6 100.0 57.5 42.5 28.7 100.0
Canada 68.3 31.7 0.0 100.0 66.6 33.4 0.0 100.0
Denmark 57.8 42.2 6.2 100.0 61.5 38.5 5.6 100.0
Finland 60.1 39.9 0.0 100.0 57.8 42.2 13.7 100.0
France 77.9 22.1 10.7 100.0 68.9 31.1 19.3 100.0
Germany 67.9 32.1 13.5 100.0 53.4 46.6 24.7 100.0
Greece – – – – 40.7 59.3 46.9 100.0
Ireland 39.6 60.4 41.5 100.0 66.0 34.0 20.0 100.0
Italy 58.4 41.6 11.4 100.0 27.4 72.6 46.4 100.0
Japan 75.2 24.8 0.0 100.0 68.4 31.6 0.0 100.0
Luxembourg 63.6 36.4 22.7 100.0 73.8 26.2 11.9 100.0
Netherlands 72.2 27.8 7.9 100.0 71.5 28.5 7.4 100.0
New Zealand 86.8 13.2 0.0 100.0 75.4 24.6 0.0 100.0
Norway 61.7 38.3 0.0 100.0 73.9 26.1 0.0 100.0
Portugal 72.2 27.8 19.8 100.0 66.1 33.9 21.8 100.0
Spain 59.6 40.4 22.6 100.0 60.8 39.2 26.9 100.0
Sweden 69.7 30.3 0.0 100.0 69.0 31.0 4.6 100.0
Switzerland 74.5 25.5 0.0 100.0 70.4 29.6 0.0 100.0
United Kingdom 56.2 43.8 20.8 100.0 60.2 39.8 21.7 100.0
United States 79.7 20.3 0.0 100.0 74.4 25.6 0.0 100.0
DAC Total 71.5 28.5 6.0 100.0 67.1 32.9 9.2 100.0
Memo items
EU members 67.2 32.8 11.3 100.0 60.6 39.4 19.7 100.0
EU members in
1989-90
67.2 32.8 12.8 100.0 60.1 39.9 20.7 100.0
Appendix Table A.3
Geographical allocation of bilateral and multilateral aid
Bilateral Multilateral
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
MENA 19 19 11 9 7 9
SSA 28 34 30 30 48 36
Asia and Pacific 26 31 38 48 35 33
Europe 15 2 8 1 0 13
Western Hemisphere 12 13 13 12 9 9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Memo:
Total (US$ billions) 34.5 33.3 26.9 7.9 12.5 12.1
Source: OECD/DAC: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, for various
years.
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Appendix Table A.4
Financial terms of ODA
Grant element of total ODA Grant share
1989-90 1999-2000 Bilateral ODA Total ODA
Australia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Austria 75.6 91.3 63.4 77.2
Belgium 99.1 99.5 96.3 97.9
Canada 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Denmark 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Finland 99.6 100.0 94.2 96.7
France 86.2 95.6 84.3 87.8
Germany 89.6 96.2 79.7 88.8
Greece – 98.2 99.2 –
Ireland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Italy 91.8 99.0 77.9 93.1
Japan 79.4 86.6 38.4 49.5
Luxembourg 81.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
Netherlands 96.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
New Zealand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Norway 99.8 99.8 98.3 98.7
Portugal 86.0 98.4 95.3 96.9
Spain 53.2 92.4 69.3 81.1
Sweden 100.0 99.8 99.2 99.4
Switzerland 100.0 100.0 98.6 99.2
United Kingdom 99.9 100.0 91.9 95.0
United States 98.3 99.6 98.8 99.0
DAC total 91.3 95.4 76.2 82.8
Note: Excluding debt re-organization. Equities are treated as having 100% grant element, but are not
treated as loans.
Source: Extracted from OECD/DAC: Development Cooperation Report, for 2001 (Table 20).
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Appendix Table A.5(a)
Allocations to multilateral agency by country, 1980 (US$ millions)
IDA
Other
WB
Total
WB IDB ADB AfDB EEC
Total
UN Other Total
Australia 80.5 0 80.5 0 36.1 0 0 50 13.1 179.7
Austria 0 -3.3 -3.3 0.3 4.4 0 0 12 13.8 27.2
Belgium 0 2.2 2.2 8.2 10.2 9.8 88.7 14.5 5.8 139.4
Canada 141.6 3.4 145 22.2 43.8 25.8 0 148.4 11.2 396.4
Denmark 44 0 44 3.6 4.7 9.3 35.6 111.6 5.8 214.6
Finland 14.2 1.4 15.6 1.7 4.2 3.4 0 16.4 3.9 45.2
France 162.7 4.5 167.2 20 31.5 7.9 398.2 62.5 14 701.3
Germany 515.2 5.7 520.9 40 2.8 31 467.2 160.6 20.4 1,243.1
Italy 312.2 33.2 345.4 21.3 3.4 22.5 187.2 18.3 1.5 599.6
Japan 619.1 51 670.1 36.4 338.4 34.6 0 248.7 14.7 1,342.9
Netherlands 94.3 1.8 96.1 2.1 2.2 0 120.2 176.9 1.3 402.8
New Zealand 2.8 1 3.8 0 0 0 0 4.8 9.1 19.9
Norway 42.3 0.8 43.1 0 6.9 12.3 0 130.3 9 201.6
Sweden 0 0 0 0 7.4 17.7 0 211.2 11 247.3
Switzerland 0 0 0 4.6 6.6 14.3 0 45.9 4.7 76.1
UK 3.7 0 3.7 39.5 37.8 28.7 280 111 25.1 525.8
United States 1,072 38 1,110 471 237 25 0 647 281 2772
DAC total 3,104 141.3 3,245.3 670.9 783.6 242.3 1,577.3 2,170 445.4 9,134.9
Appendix Table A.5(b)
Allocations to multilateral agency by country, 1990 (US$ millions)
IDA
Other
WB
Total
WB IDB ADB AfDB EEC UNDP
Other
UN
Total
UN Other Total
Australia 2 0 2 0 80 0 0 15 61 76 44 202
Austria 47 0 47 1 0 13 0 10 15 25 9 94
Belgium 87 10 97 1 10 18 121 36 32 68 27 342
Canada 237 15 252 11 17 111 0 62 208 270 118 780
Denmark 77 1 78 0 0 31 68 89 138 227 72 476
Finland 41 2 43 1 23 15 0 52 149 201 64 348
France 268 50 318 3 21 94 764 53 92 145 205 1,551
Germany 524 0 524 13 92 96 784 80 204 284 48 1,841
Ireland 5 1 6 0 0 0 23 1 3 4 0 34
Italy 291 49 340 4 53 87 435 78 183 261 103 1,283
Japan 997 171 1,168 0 455 8 0 92 392 484 168 2,282
Netherlands 173 21 194 3 29 13 192 84 164 248 12 691
New Zealand 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 1 11
Norway 79 30 109 0 8 35 0 85 186 271 26 449
Sweden 121 2 123 4 15 46 0 117 250 367 73 628
Switzerland 0 0 0 1 16 46 0 47 70 117 20 199
UK 310 0 310 -1 4 37 587 48 148 196 30 1,164
United States 961 158 1,119 172 299 227 0 105 619 724 455 2,996
DAC total 4,223 511 4,734 213 1,123 878 2,975 1,057 2,916 3,973 1,475 15,372
Appendix Table A.5(c)
Allocations to multilateral agency by country, 2000 (US$ millions)
IDA Other WB Total WB RDBs IDB ADB AfDB EEC UNDP Other UN Total UN Other Total
Australia 74 1 75 71 0 71 0 0 4 51 55 28 229
Austria 26 0 26 23 2 4 17 87 6 14 20 11 166
Belgium 51 5 56 8 2 0 6 190 14 35 49 39 343
Canada 136 0 136 88 2 29 29 0 28 96 124 234 583
Denmark 51 24 75 68 3 6 50 93 59 192 251 153 641
Finland 14 0 14 22 1 3 13 51 12 50 62 5 154
France 238 4 242 83 2 2 80 792 14 111 125 34 1,276
Germany 384 0 384 209 15 27 166 1,237 20 367 387 127 2,343
Greece 2 0 3 4 0 0 0 98 0 16 16 6 127
Ireland 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 47 4 18 22 3 80
Italy 0 19 19 76 20 20 30 638 36 166 202 65 999
Japan 1,146 7 1,153 891 102 547 242 0 111 1,193 1,304 391 3,740
Luxembourg 4 0 8 0 0 0 0 15 2 8 10 1 33
Netherlands 197 0 197 38 38 0 0 233 67 293 360 64 892
New Zealand 5 2 7 4 0 4 0 0 2 6 8 10 28
Norway 31 2 33 49 1 4 35 0 65 143 208 40 330
Portugal 13 0 13 11 0 0 11 59 1 5 6 2 92
Spain 31 0 35 19 14 0 5 352 6 44 50 18 475
Sweden 149 2 151 67 3 15 31 83 59 189 248 9 557
Switzerland 83 0 100 62 0 7 56 0 31 47 78 23 263
United Kingdom 258 13 271 130 2 27 101 977 57 302 359 55 1,792
United States 771 4 775 249 42 91 131 0 75 1,167 1,242 284 2,550
DAC total 3,672 109 3,781 2,172 249 857 1,002 4,950 672 4,516 5,188 1,603 17,694
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